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INTRODUCTION

A barrage of high-impact storms with torrential rains and vi
cious winds pummeled the Gulf Coast states during the 2005 hurri
cane season. Hurricane Katrina alone resulted in a large-scale
disaster where over 1300 lives were lost, property owners suffered
approximately $75 billion in property damage, and, in particular,
uncertainty erupted between homeowners and lenders.! The finan
cial costs do not recede for the 1.2 million displaced and distressed
homeowners, as they try to repair their homes while continuing to

* Matthew D. Ekins is a 2007 graduate from Indiana University School of Law in
Indianapolis and a 2003 graduate of Utah State University. He worked in the real es
tate title insurance industry for over two years as an escrow officer. The author thanks
his wife, Andrea; father, David; and sister, Valarie, for their enduring encouragement
throughout the life of this Article. He also thanks Professor Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., for his
sage advice on this Article.
1. TImothy N. Brown, Dealing with Disasters: Real Estate Lessons from Katrina,
PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 34, 34.
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make their monthly mortgage payments. 2 If homeowners falter in
paying their mortgage debts, foreclosure is a likely result.3
In 2002, one study estimated the lender foreclosure costs alone
to be $58,759 per home. 4 If only 500,000 of the affected homeown
ers defaulted and lenders elected to foreclose, the lender costs, in
addition to the property damage estimates, could reach $29 bil
lion-more than one-third of the estimated Katrina-caused prop
erty damage. 5
On a smaller scope, the average existing home value in 2004
for the southeastern United States was $182,820. 6 If a home re
tained this value after the disaster, foreclosure costs would re
present an estimated thirty-two percent loss in pre-disaster equity.
Where the disaster caused "severe damage"-destruction of at least
half of the home's value-foreclosure would likely result in a sixty
four percent loss in the post-disaster equity.7 These estimates ex
clude consideration of the amount of mortgage indebtedness se
cured before the disaster, which the homeowner is still obligated to
repay.8
This Article examines, through a historical lens, the effects that
large-scale disasters have had on the residential homeowner 9 
lenderlO relationship and proposes relief provisions to better miti
2. OFFICE OF POL'y DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN
DEV., UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS 1ST QUARTER 2006, at 5 (2006)
[hereinafter UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET].
3. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 4
5, 580-83 (4th ed. 2002).
4. Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. Green, Innovative Servicing Technology: Smart
Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 13 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 04-03,
2004), available at http://www.freddiemac.cominews/pdflfmwp_0403_servicing.pdf.In
addition to the costs, the foreclosure process takes an average of eighteen months. Id.
5. Brown, supra note 1, at 34.
6. FREDDIE MAC, 2007 REPORTER FACT BOOK 43-44 [hereinafter 2007 RE
PORTER FACT BOOK], available at http://www.freddiemac.comlnews/factbook/pdfl
reporter-factbook. pdf.
7. See UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET, supra note 2, at 5. The Federal Emer
gency Management Agency estimates that 125,731 homes suffered severe damage,
179,378 homes suffered major damage, and 892,390 homes suffered minor damage. Id.
at 6.
8. For example, in a worst case scenario, the financing obtained immediately
before the hurricane would leave the mortgage 100% undersecured because of home
damage and substantially bar recovery of lender expenses if foreclosed.
9. "Homeowner," in this Article, inclusively refers to mortgagor, buyer, and land
owner when applicable in the appropriate context.
10. "Lender," for purpose of this Article, combines references to mortgagee,
bank, mortgage broker, mortgage company, savings and loan company, and other gov
ernmental lending institutions.
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gate financial loss and avoid the burden resulting from foreclosure.
First, an examination of the Great Depression looks at problems
that contracting parties faced, measures implemented by state and
federal authorities, and lasting consequences arising from that era.
Next, the Article asserts that legislatures should implement a stan
dardized framework from which homeowners and lenders can ef
fectively mitigate loss arising from large-scale disasters. Finally, the
Article specifically addresses two measures: a workout plan and a
cramdown provision. In the wake of large-scale disasters, direct
loss is inevitable; minimization of the indirect, corollary loss relies
upon humanity's acumen. In considering the efficacy of mitigation
measures to recover from a large-scale disaster, organizing stan
dardized relief provisions fosters the necessary post-disaster per
spective for the homeowner and lender, and preserves, although
not perfectly, both parties' prevailing contractual interests.
I.

HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION

"[M}ortgages on single family homes [are} the 'backbone of the
American financial system. '''11
A.

Prevalent Conditions During the Depression

The Great Depression was an economic crisis in American his
tory, which is unrivaled in scope and effect to this day. 12 It affected
millions of homeowners and pushed lenders toward insolvency.B
The mortgage debt totaled forty-three billion dollars, which was ap
proximately three times the railroad debt, four times the long-term
industrial debt, and comparable to the federal, state, county, and
municipal debt.14 In 1932, nearly 250,000 mortgages were fore
closed upon nationwide, and, in 1933, the rate of foreclosure ex
ceeded 1000 homes per day.15 Because of the economic
circumstances that ultimately resulted in foreclosure, many proud
11. Fred Wright, The Effects of New Deal Real Estate Residential Finance and
Foreclosure Policies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great De
pression, 57 ALA. L. REV. 231, 242 n.76 (2005) (quoting Ronald Tobey et aI., Moving
Out and Settling In: Residential Mobility, Horne Owning, and the Public Enfrarning of
Citizenship, 1921-1950, 95 AM. HIST. REV. 1395, 1417 (1990) (quoting Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Campaign Address on the Eight Great Credit Groups of the Nation (Oct.
21,1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 829
(1938))).
12. Id. at 239.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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homeowners were reduced to being economic serfs on the land that
they previously owned. 16
Many factors precipitated the harsh reality that existed during
the 1930s. William Prosser noted the drastic near collapse of com
modity prices that fell below the producers' break-even pointP
The inflating dollar, coupled with these circumstances, resulted in
increased residential mortgage default when mortgage balloon
notes, the industry standard at the time, matured. 18 The inevitable
default resulted in a rapid increase in the number of foreclosure
sales, which depressed the market because of the surplus of fore
closed homes. 19 In addition, the large inventory of foreclosed
homes chilled competitive bidding at sheriff's sales, and encouraged
lenders to bid nominal prices and seek a deficiency judgment for
the remaining balance nearly equal to the mortgage debt,2°
Homeowners confronted this mounting crisis by implementing
self-help measures. The "penny sale" was one remedial measure
used in Minnesota. 21 When a farmer's personal property was up for
bid at the sheriff's sale, neighboring farmers would band together
and purchase the property for pennies, then resell the property
back to the original foreclosed farmer at a nominal price. 22
Some courts took matters into their hands by imposing an "up
set price. "23 The courts would establish a floor price and the fore
closed property could be sold only at or above that predetermined
minimum price. 24 However, these efforts alone were not enough to
curb the housing crisis. 25 Beginning in the early 1930s, the public
16. Roland C. Amundson & Lewis J. Rotman, Depression Jurisprudence Revis
ited: Minnesota's Moratorium on Mortgage Foreclosure, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 805,
822 (1984).
17. William L. Prosser, The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium, 7 S. CAL. L. REv.
353, 354 (1934).
18. Id. at 345; see also Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural Philosophies and Policies
in the New Deal, 68 MINN. L. REV. 333, 334 (1983) (crisis on the farms stirred national
debate for farm relief). As Prosser noted, "[a] survey of farm mortgages in Minnesota
... indicated that, in 1930,53.8% of the owner-operated farms in Minnesota were mort
gaged." Prosser, supra note 17, at 354 n.10. For a description of a balloon note see
infra note 79.
19. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 822.
20. Prosser, supra note 17, at 354-55.
21. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 822.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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placed pressure on lawmakers to take steps to ameliorate the me
tastasizing crisis. 26
B.

State Legislative Response to Alleviate Increasing Foreclosures

In response to public sentiment, Minnesota lawmakers enacted
a mortgage foreclosure moratorium,27 which granted some degree
of relief to defaulting homeowners.28 This type of legislation ex
panded into other states. 29 The validity of the mortgage foreclosure
moratorium was premised on the legislative declaration of an eco
nomic emergency that qualified the passage of such legislation. 3D
The landmark case Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell
established the mortgage foreclosure moratorium law as a valid,
reasonable relief measure for homeowners facing foreclosure. 31
Blaisdell involved the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law (Mor
atorium Law), which the state's legislature passed on April 18,
1933.32 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the Moratorium
Law as valid,33 but its decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. 34 The Court considered whether the asserted right to imple
ment the emergency legislation modifying mortgage provisions con
flicted with the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution
prohibiting impairment of contractual obligations. 35
The Moratorium Law provided that, during times of a declared
economic emergency, judicial relief could extend foreclosure court
proceedings, sales could be postponed for a finite period, and the
redemption period could be extended. 36 Where the district court
granted extended foreclosure relief, the homeowner was required
to pay either income generated by the property, if applicable, or a
Id. at 822-23.
27. /d. at 822-24. The Governor of Minnesota first acted in response to the de
mand of public outcry. Id. at 823. Governor Olson issued an executive order that pro
hibited sheriff sales until the legislature had adjourned. Id. This order was later
declared unconstitutional. Id. at 824. However this was an impetus for state legisla
tures taking action by passing moratorium legislation. Id.
28. See Wright, supra note 11, at 240.
29. Id. at 241.
30. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 824.
31. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
32. See id. at 415-16.
33. Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 249 N.W. 893, 894 (Minn. 1933) (per
curiam), affd, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
34. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416.
35. Id. at 425; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
36. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416.
26.
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reasonable rental value to the lender as determined by the court.37
The Moratorium Law included a sunset provision that limited its
availability to this particular declared emergency and not beyond
May 1, 1935, two years after passage. 38 It was this law that im
pacted the Blaisdell family during the Great Depression.
The Blaisdell family owned a fourteen-room home encum
bered by a mortgage lien held by Home Building & Loan Associa
tion. 39 The Blaisdells' subsequent default resulted in a foreclosure
sale on May 2, 1932, where the lender purchased the residence for
$3700.98, while the reasonable market value was $6000. 40 The
Blaisdell family would lose all equity and the right to redeem one
year later on May 2, 1933.41
The Supreme Court quoted Justice Olsen of the Minnesota Su
preme Court who stated:
"The present nation wide and world wide business and financial
crisis has the same results as if it were caused by flood, earth
quake, or disturbance in nature. It has deprived millions of per
sons in this nation of their employment and means of earning a
living for themselves and their families; ... it actually has re
sulted in the loss of their homes by a number of our people and
threatens to result in the loss of their homes by many other peo
ple in this state .... "42

In upholding the Moratorium Law, the Supreme Court found
that the statute did not impair the integrity of the remaining mort
gage debt, and that interest continued to accrue. 43 Further, it found
that the Moratorium Law did not disturb the lender's right to fore
close and seek a deficiency judgment. The only redemption condi
tion altered was time, which was extended. 44 The rental value paid
applied to taxes, insurance, and interest. 45
Id. at 416-17.
38. Id. at 416.
39. Id. at 419-20. The extra rooms provided income when the family used them
for room and board. /d. at 420.
40. Id. at 419. The Blaisdell family argued that, in addition to the loss of their
home, they would also lose the equity in the home. Id. The foreclosure sale covered all
outstanding debt and arrearage fees. Id. at 419-20.
41. Id. at 419.
42. Id. at 423 (quoting Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 249 N.W. 334, 340
(Minn. 1933) (Olsen, J., concurring), affd, 290 U.S. 398 (1934».
43. Id. at 425.
44. /d.
37.

45.

Id.
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The Supreme Court's ruling rested upon five essential ele
ments.46 First, the existence of an emergency was reason to protect
vital community interests. 47 Second, the legislation addressed "a le
gitimate end," which was the "protection of legitimate social inter
est."48 Third, relief was based on appropriate and reasonable
conditions. 49 Fourth, conditions to extend the redemption period
could not be unreasonable and must consider the interest of home
owner and lender. 50 Fifth, the moratorium legislation was limited
in duration, not lasting beyond the emergency.51
Blaisdell suggests that in a time of crisis, the Constitution
should be interpreted to "comfort" citizens, rather than "pinch"
them. 52 The Moratorium Law provided a mere modification of the
remedy available to the lender, while upholding the homeowner's
legal obligation of repayment. 53 It afforded the comfort, in terms of
time needed to cure the problem, rather than having the home
owner feel the pinch of a valid contractual obligation upheld in ex
treme circumstances. In this way, the law recognized that the
victims were not at fault and placed in circumstances beyond their
control and afforded assistance where possible. 54
C.

Federal Response to the Great Depression

In addition to state legislative response, the federal govern
ment sought to ameliorate the growing crisis with administrative
measures. 55 The federal government first used its financial might
by injecting money into the mortgage industry to correct the hous
ing disaster. 56 However, the opening of the federal coffers had a de
minimis impact on the housing crisis. 57.
46. Id. at 444-47; see also Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 825-26.
47. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444.
48. Id. at 445.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 445-46.
51. Id. at 447.
52. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emer
gency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 734-35 (2006) (exploring the Constitution as "comforting"

rather than a "barrier to public happiness").
53. See Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 819.
54. See 131 CONGo REC. 16,927-28 (1985) (statements of Rep. De La Garza and
Rep. Gunderson).
55. Wright, supra note 11, at 241.
56. Id.
57. Id. Of the estimated 1.8 million applications for the federal HOLC, over half
were either rejected due to lack of security or withdrawn before final review. Id. at 247.
Only one in ten residential home owners received relief from foreclosure. Id. Al
though the Federal Home Loan Bank Board sought to infuse money into the banking
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Quashing the Crisis with Policy

The federal government also implemented a policy approach
that significantly reversed the housing market's foreclosure rate. 58
One of the first executive actions taken by newly elected President
Franklin D. Roosevelt was to provide relief to homeowners reeling
from external market forces beyond their controp9 Two months
after taking office, President Roosevelt signed the Home Owners'
Loan Act into law. 60 This Act created the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation (HOLC).61 The fundamental premise of the program
was to "(1) protect small homeowners from foreclosure, (2) relieve
them of part of the burden of excessive interest and principal pay
ments incurred during a period of higher values and higher earning
power, and (3) declare that it was national policy to protect home
ownership."62
The HOLC operated by providing federally backed HOLC
bonds in exchange for defaulted home mortgages. 63 The bonds
generally had a lower interest rate than residential mortgage rates,
and the HOLC guaranteed principal and interest payments. 64 The
HOLC refinanced approved homeowners, consolidating all arrear
ages, fees, and back taxes. 65 The refinanced loan interest payments,
subject to the HOLC's approval, could be delayed up to three
years, thereby providing relief from the threat of foreclosure until
the economy improved. 66
To the mortgage industry's detriment, Congress included limit
ing measures on the HOLC's lending practices. 67 Financiallimita
tions included total funding of $4.75 billion in bonds during three
years, interest rates no greater than four percent, and a loan matur
ity limit of eighteen years.68 Other binding provisions required that
industry, of the 41,000 homeowners that applied, only three applications were ap
proved. Id. at 241.
58. Id. at 246.
59. Id. at 242.
60. Id.; see Home Owners' Loan Act of June 13, 1933, 12 U.S.c. § 1461 (2000).
61. Wright, supra note 11, at 242.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 242-43.
66. Id. at 243.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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the value of residential property exceed $20,000 and the loan
amount be no greater than eighty percent of the appraised value. 69
On average, homeowners who qualified for the HOLe assis
tance were in default for two years on the original note and mort
gage and nearly three years behind on property tax payments. 70
Even though the HOLe helped many homeowners, foreclosures
still occurred on 2.5% of all of the HOLC's loans.1 1 However, two
thirds of foreclosures resulted from the homeowner's unwillingness
to cooperate with the HOLe when it estimated that the home
owner had the ability to pay.12
2.

Policy and Rulemaking Response

One year after signing the Home Owners' Loan Act, President
Roosevelt successfully lobbied for the National Housing Act of
1934 (Housing Act).7 3 The Housing Act did not allocate aid
rather, it laid the foundation for indirect administrative measures to
accelerate recovery.74 The Housing Act created the Federal Hous
ing Administration (FHA), which served as a catalyst to implement
policy tailored to revive the ailing mortgage industry.75
The FHA implemented revolutionary standards in the mort
gage industry. It offered deficiency insurance of up to twenty per
cent of the loan amount so long as the private lender met federally
mandated criteria.76 Borrowers paid a one-half percent fee in addi
tion to the standard interest rate, which the FHA deposited into a
reserve fund used to cover mortgage deficiencies. 77 The FHA also
69. Id. The HOLe molded the way in which appraisals were done and how the
lending institutions utilized this developing discipline. Id. The end result was a greater
standardization of the real estate appraisal. Id. The change also resulted in the redlin
ing of more "risky" neighborhoods. Id.
70. Id. at 249.
71. Id. When the borrower defaulted, the HOLe exercised broad restraint in
filing a deficiency judgment against the borrower, unless the borrower was clearly able
to pay, or state law mandated that the HOLe seek a deficiency judgment to protect its
property interest. Id. at 250.
72. Id. at 249.
73. Id. at 251.
74. Id.
75. See Adam Gordon, The Creation of Home Ownership: How New Deal
Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to
Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE LJ. 186, 193 (2005) ("[T]he federal
government enabled lenders to provide home mortgage credit without any risk of
loss-a vital guarantee given how much money those lenders had lost in the foreclo
sures of the early Depression.").
76. Wright, supra note 11, at 251.
77. Gordon, supra note 75, at 193.
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progressively lowered the standard requirement for down pay
menU 8 In exchange, the lender offered borrowers fully self-amor
tized loans79 with a high loan-to-value ratio, typically eighty
percent. 80 One of the more important benchmarks of the Housing
Act was the fact that it did not require a large amount of federal
funding. 81 Instead, borrowers paid for the program by paying a
mortgage insurance premium integrated into the monthly principal
and interest payments. 82
The same authority that permitted the FHA to insure mort
gages83 emboldened the FHA to stipulate construction standards
like setbacks, cul-de-sacs for residential neighborhoods, and sepa
rate zoning for commercial and residential property.84 The FHA
clamped down on usurious interest rates on second mortgages and
limited lender and builder fees. 85 The FHA requirements made
borrowing for residential homeowners less expensive and less
risky,86 and demand for new homes and new capital grew. 87
In response to the residential industry crisis of the Great De
pression, systemic changes occurred in legislation, administrative
78. Id. However, these changes were not completely for the better. While a
lower down payment allowed younger homeowners access to mortgage funds, it also
increased the likelihood of loss in default. Id. at 193-94. Where little equity exists in
the home and there is a dramatic drop in property value, the borrower has little incen
tive to keep the house and is likely to walk away. Id. at 194.
79. Wright, supra note 11, at 251. Before the mortgage industry changed during
the Great Depression, most mortgages were short-term-between three and five years.
Id. at 246; see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 2. Moreover, the loans were not
amortized. Id. This type of loan is commonly referred to as a balloon loan. Id. The
balloon loan was problematic during the Great Depression because homeowners were
frequently unable to refinance the mortgage when the mortgaged "ballooned" at the
end of the term. Wright, supra note 11, at 246. The HOLe offered fifteen-year amor
tized loans, a drastic change from the industry standard. Id. The belief was that as
equity grew, the likelihood of default decreased. Id. An amortized loan spreads princi
pal and interest payments over the life of the loan. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 3, at 2-3. The monthly payment is fixed with the payment ratio of principal to
interest incrementally increasing with each pay period. See id.
80. Wright, supra note 11, at 25I.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. See Gordon, supra note 75, at 193.
84. Wright, supra note 11, at 257.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 260; see also Gordon, supra note 75, at 194. Much pressure also
came from developers, builders, and other related business that were hit hard by the
Depression. /d. These entities relied heavily on the housing market and available
capital.
87. Wright, supra note 11, at 260.
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rule making, and in the private lending system. 88 Generally, foreclo
sure moratorium laws expanded beyond Minnesota and provided
legal delays in foreclosure proceedings. In addition, balloon note
usage was replaced by the amortization of principal and interest
over the life of the loan and government regulators integrated new
requirements to stabilize the housing market. 89
II.
A.

STANDARDIZED FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE MITIGATION

Introduction

Empowering contracting parties in disaster recovery is essen
tial. The previous historical analysis exemplified what was less ef
fective-congressional funding of lending institutions. It also
illuminated what was more effective-rules and guidelines giving
direction to homeowners and lenders. 90 This knowledge is para
mount in developing modern measures to address disaster recovery.
The comparison exhibits a valuable predictive function of what will
hedge against loss and hasten recovery.
The current pervasive notion is that homeowners must make
all mortgage payments on time or the lender will foreclose on the
property.91 In reality, the industry is not so absolute. 92 We-soci
ety, local, and national governments-should resist the routinely in
grained response to solely give financial assistance. Instead, we
should enact a framework that empowers those affected by large
scale disasters. The difficult balance is to respect the contracting
parties' rights while attempting to assist both parties. 93 Considera
tion of less-effective and more-effective mitigation measures will
manifest workable standardized relief provisions that will create the
88. Id. at 250.
89. Id.
90. As the book of Acts illustrates: a lame man sat before the temple asking for
alms and Peter said, "Silver and gold have I none, but such as I have give I unto thee.
In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth rise up and walk." Acts 3:1-7. The lame man
immediately received strength in his feet and ankles, arose, and walked. [d. at 3:7-8.
Peter helped this man by a blessing of health, not by fleeting monetary aid.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 134-135.
92. Id.
93. See generally Robert R. Rosenthal, The Role of Courts of Equity in Prevent
ing Acceleration Predicated upon a Mortgagor's Inadvertent Default, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 897, 898-99 (1971) (" '[S]tability of contract obligations must not be undermined
by judicial sympathy,' and ... 'the interests of certainty and security in real estate
transactions forbid us, in the absence of fraud, bad faith or unconscionable conduct, to
recede from the doctrine that is so deeply imbedded in equity.'" (quoting Grafv. Hope
Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 885 (N.Y. 1930»).
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necessary post-disaster perspective for the homeowner and lender
while modifying pre-disaster contractual rights and obligations.
B.

A Forward-Looking Standardized Response

Consistent, standardized relief provisions will improve the mit
igation of financial loss arising from a large-scale disaster, and in
crease lender profit. 94 Like the FHA's success during and after the
Great Depression, rule making for standardized relief provisions
will do more to recover from a large-scale disaster than simply
opening the federal and state coffers to cure the ailment. 95 Stan
dardized relief provisions are a starting point that do not exist in
many mortgage forms, and are feasible mitigation tools that dimin
ish clouds of uncertainty that abruptly appear after a catastrophe.
Equity and loan conditions may be changed, in favor of both par
ties, to accommodate new circumstances resulting from a
catastrophe.
If circumstances arising from a catastrophe cause homeowners
to stumble into default and foreclosure results, the lenders' direct
financial losses are significant. 96 Furthermore, indirect foreclosure
costs accumulate: Homeowners incur expenses during foreclosure,
home values in corresponding neighborhoods become depressed,
and state and local governments lose tax revenue. 97 The cumulative
estimated costs total $73,300 per foreclosure. 98 The ripple effect
may also extend to municipal services and school systems that rely
on property tax revenues. 99 Having standardized relief provisions
in place before disaster strikes will successfully mitigate post-disas
ter loss, in particular, keeping foreclosure at bay. All this can be
done at no or negligible direct costs to state or federal governments.
94. Cf Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 13.
95. See Gordon, supra note 75, at 192-94.
96. See supra text accompanying note 5. With the possibility of a wave of foreclo
sure looming, Washington lawmakers are determining whether or not the government
should intervene and rescue the struggling mortgage industry. Edmund L. Andrews, In
Washington, Measuring a Lifeline, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at Cl. Interestingly, the
wave is estimated to hit close to the elections, thus providing more incentive for politi
cians to take a closer look at the situation. Id. Some Democrats are hoping for changes
that will shift the balance of power between borrowers and lenders. /d.
97. Desiree Hatcher, Foreclosure Alternatives: A Case for Preserving Homeowner
ship, PROFITWISE NEWS & VIEWS, Feb. 2006, at 2-3, available at http://www.chicagofed.
orglcommunity_developmentlfiles/02_2006_foreclosure_alt. pdf.
98. Id. at 3 (breaking down costs of a foreclosure as follows: homeowner, $7200;
lender, $1500; servicer, $1100; FHA-HUD, $26,500; city, $27,000; and neighbors,
$10,000).
99. See id. at 2-3.
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Inefficient Disaster Response Happens

On January 17, 1994, a 6.7 magnitude earthquake struck the
densely populated community of Northridge, California.lOo The
Northridge quake left Sondra Sutherland's Northridge residence
uninhabitable and she was forced to vacate her premises while ma
jor repairs were performed. lOl As a result of the earthquake's dam
age, the home's value plummeted to approximately $51,000. 102
Sutherland had purchased this condominium in 1992 for $105,000
and had executed a mortgage for $101,000, which was transferred to
Barclays American/Mortgage Corporation for servicing. 103
Sutherland communicated with a lender representative three
days after the earthquake and they agreed to "stop" the account
while she rented an apartment during the repairs. I04 The stop con
sisted of no monthly payments due, no notices of default, and no
reporting to credit agencies. I05 Sutherland relied upon this oral
agreement for a three-month stop and reallocated her funds to pay
for earthquake-related costs during the period of the stop.1 06
Contrary to Sutherland's belief that the postponed payments
would be added to the end of the loan period, the lender billed
Sutherland for all outstanding back payments along with the cur
rent monthly payment. I07 The lender threatened foreclosure if
Sutherland failed to bring the mortgage current. lOS Subsequently,
Sutherland brought an action for a declaratory judgment to clarify
the oral agreement and to enjoin the lender from foreclosing.10 9
The confusion arising from the ambiguity of the terms of the
oral "stop" agreement resulted in default by the borrower, costly
litigation fees for both parties, and near foreclosure on Sutherland's
condominium. 110 These problems would have been averted had a
standardized framework been in place before the earthquake. A
standardized framework fosters certainty in communication, facili
tates more efficient and quicker responses to a vital community in
100. Sutherland v. Barclays Am. Mortgage Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614, 617 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 617 n.1.
103. Id. at 617.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 618.
109. Id. at 619-20.
110. Id. at 618.
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terest, and forbears impending foreclosure proceedings to give
homeowners the opportunity to get back on their feet. The frame
work gives homeowners and lenders a better chance to mitigate loss
and shorten recovery time.
D.

Standardization Is Necessary

Standardization of disaster response for lenders and homeown
ers provides controlled flexibility during catastrophes, instead of re
quiring parties to navigate the complex existing laws that are not
structured to respond to such disasters. 11l A standardized response
plays a critical role in protecting and preserving the legitimate so
cial interest of homeownership by mitigating loss without requiring
additional allocation of taxpayers' dollars.112 Large-scale disasters
give rise to unforeseen financial burdens flowing from circum
stances beyond the homeowner's control. 113 Providing uniform
measures for homeowners to retain possession encourages them to
repair and maintain the home that serves as collateral for the mort
gage debt, instead of homeowners complacently allowing foreclo
sure for twenty or fifty cents on the dollar. 114 The value of lenders'
collateral is retained and lenders avoid costly foreclosure proceed
ings. Moreover, foreclosures can lead to greater long-term loss due
to declining home prices and abandonment of homes.1 15 Individu
ally and collectively, the mortgage industry avoids a depressed
housing market. Standardized relief measures will "enable these
families to remain on the land they love and in the communities
that they have been a part of for generations."116
111. 131 CONGo REC. 16,928 (1985) (statement of Rep. Gunderson). The flexibil
ity will make it more likely that the family farmer can keep the farm. Similarly, flexibil
ity will help the homeowner's likelihood of retaining the home. Cf id.
112. Id. at 16,924 (statement of Rep. Synar). Congress found these arguments
persuasive when passing the Chapter 12 bankruptcy relief provisions in response to the
financial crisis farmers were facing in the 1980s. See generally 8 COLLIER ON BANK
RUPTCY <JI 1200.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2007)
(discussing the reasons behind passing Chapter 12).
113. See 131 CONGo REc. at 16,927-28 (statements of Rep. De La Garza and Rep.
Gunderson).
114. See generally U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Federal Agency Regulatory Response
to Hurricane Katrina, http://www.sba.gov/advo/re~katrina.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2007) ("The Department of Housing and Urban Development has instructed all FHA
approved lenders to provide foreclosure relief to FHA-insured families who are af
fected by Hurricane Katrina. The relief includes a special 90-day moratorium on all
foreclosures of FHA-insured properties in the declared disaster areas.").
115. 131 CONGo REc. 16,928 (statement of Rep. Gunderson).
116. Id. at 16,927 (statement of Rep. De La Garza) (debating in favor of
cramdown relief provisions for American family farmers).
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Triggers for Disaster Relief Assistance

Disaster relief for the homeowner should be made available
when circumstances substantially impair the homeowner's capacity
to make short-term mortgage payments. 117 A less effective alterna
tive trigger is to award relief only when "equitable and just to do
SO."118

A relief trigger may take various forms.1 19 First, the con
tracting parties can simply include contract terms that trigger mutu
ally agreed upon disaster relief measures, which is similar to an
acceleration remedy.120 Second, lawmakers can pass legislation de
claring the application and availability of assistance to disaster vic
tims.l2l Third, courts can order the disaster relief be made
available. 122 Finally, a gubernatorial proclamation I23 or a presiden
tial declaration can enable relief measures via state and federal
agencies, specifically for victims located in disaster areas. 124
Historically, some courts and agencies have looked at particu
lar factual circumstances to determine whether the homeowner has
an involuntary inability to pay, thus triggering relief measures. 125
Factors considered were significant property damage or deprecia
tion, economic shock from a disaster, unemployment, underem
ployment, illness, and death of a family member. 126 The test has
117. Austin J. Jaffe & Jeffery M. Sharp, Contractual Theory and Mortgage Fore
closure Moratoria, 12 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 77, 79-80 (1996).
118. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 831 n.156.
119. The scope of what will trigger disaster relief should be dynamic enough to
address a single residence flooded by a storm or an entire region devastated by a bar
rage of hurricanes. The test should be a substantial impairment of the homeowner's
ability to make short-term payments that is a result of circumstances beyond the home
owner's control.
120. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uniform Instru
ment, Louisiana, Single Family (Form 3019) [hereinafter Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uni
form Instrument], available at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniformJunifsecurity.html
(follow the "Form 3019: Louisiana Mortgage" hyperlink). The mortgage provides con
ditional clauses controlling default, acceleration, and cure. [d. at 13. This form could
expressly provide disaster remedies and identify under what conditions assistance can
be made available to the homeowner in the event of a disaster. Id.
121. See, e.g., Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 824.
122. See Wright, supra note 11, at 240 (noting that one form of mortgage morato
rium legislation gave the courts the authority to delay foreclosure proceedings).
123. See supra text accompanying note 25; see also Proclamation No. 48 KBB
2005, State of Louisiana Executive Department, State of Emergency-Hurricane Katrina
(Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://www.blancogovernor.comJassets/docslProclamations/
48pro2005-Emergency-HurricaneKatrina.pdf.
124. See Exec. Order No. 13,390, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,327 (Nov. 1,2005).
125. See Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 831-33.
126. Id.
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not been a bright-line rule; rather, the decision maker has had the
discretion to balance the facts and consider the circumstances.
The "equitable" approach is vague, uncertain, and its results
lack uniformity.12 7 It relies on political sentiments and notions of
extraordinary relief. 128 The "inability" approach quantifies param
eters, and can be readily ascertained between homeowner and
lender.129 It works better on a case-by-case basis, rather than
broadly addressing large numbers of mortgages.
Once the cumulative effects substantially impair a home
owner's ability to meet short-term obligations, the relief measures
should be triggered. 130 Foreknowledge of disaster response triggers
will allow lenders and homeowners to better gauge when relief
measures will apply in the wake of an unforeseen disaster and when
to implement such measures in a uniform manner. 131
F.

Standardized Workout Plan

While no statutory requirements currently exist for lenders and
homeowners to use a workout plan to aid hurricane victims, Fannie
Mae has encouraged servicers to use relief provisions.132 Using
such relief provisions will protect the residential housing market,
which President Franklin D. Roosevelt viewed as the "wheel within
the wheel to move the whole economic engine. "133
A workout plan is a tool used between a lender and a default
ing homeowner to ensure repayment of the mortgage, but in terms
127. See generally HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
EQUITY 47-49 (2d ed. 1948) (stating the historical reasons that equitable relief is used
only when the remedy at law is inadequate).
128. See generally id. (discussing how equitable relief is "extraordinary" not
"ordinary").
129. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 831-33.
130. See supra text accompanying note 117.
131. The interest rate basically consists of two parts: the base and the amount of
risk. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 2. The base is set by the market and the
interest exceeding the base reflects what the company hopes to make and what the risk
is worth to the lender. Id.; see also Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., 102
F.3d 874, 876 (7th Cir. 1996).
132. Letter from Pamela S. Johnson, Senior Vice President, Fannie Mae, to All
Fannie Mae Single-Family Mortgage Sellers and Services (Feb. 14, 2006) [hereinafter
Fannie Mae Letter, Feb. 14, 2006], available at http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/
ssglannltrs/pdf/2006/ll0l06.pdf (reminding mortgage sellers and servicers of relief provi
sions that should be used: forbearance, foreclosure moratorium, deed-in-lieu of foreclo
sure, and limited circumstances for foreclosure). Fannie Mae also encouraged waiver of
any prepayment penalty if the mortgage was to be paid off by insurance proceeds. Id.
133. Wright, supra note 11, at 250.
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alternative to the original note.134 Notably, this malleable tool
seeks to overcome a pervasive paradigm regarding residential mort
gages: Either the homeowner is current with all payments or one
missed payment results in a lender's absolute right to foreclose. 135
The mortgage industry is in the beginning stages of overcoming this
stigma as evidenced by empirical data on the success rate of
workout plans used to prevent foreclosure. Workout plans resulted
in an eighty percent reduction in the probability of home loss
among all loans and a sixty-eight percent reduction in loss for low
and moderate-income homeowners.136 Concerning the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes, Fannie Mae has utilized workout agreements con
sisting of forbearance for a determined period of time, foreclosure
moratorium on residences located in the hardest hit counties, and
refraining from reporting delinquencies to credit bureaus.137
Legislation requiring workout plans may not be necessary.
The parties have the ability to modify the contract and some lend
ers have offered workout plans on their own volition. 138 Some
states permit lenders to begin foreclosure seven months after accel
eration of the loan, which may be adequate time for homeowners to
resolve their problems. 139 Some may even argue that legislated
workout agreements should not occur because such legislation vio
lates the sanctity of contract.1 40
While lenders and homeowners may modify the agreement,
the lender maintains superior bargaining power because the mort
134. Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 5-6.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 21, 23.
137. Fannie Mae Letter, Feb. 14, 2006, supra note 132.
138. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of
How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and
Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 870 (2006) (describing the relation between the
standard-form contract and parties' power to bargain and that the form is crucial to
maintain the relationship).
139. To sell a house in Illinois, for example, one must wait the longer of seven
months from the date of filing or three months from the date of judgment. 735 ILL.
COMPo STAT. 5/15-1603 (West 2006). Similarly, in Vermont:
No sale of a dwelling house of two units or less when currently occupied by the
owner as his or her principal residence may take place within seven months of
service of the foreclosure complaint, unless the court finds that the occupant is
making waste of the property or the parties mutually agree after suit to a
shorter period.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531a (2002).
140. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n V. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,448-82 (Suth
erland, J., dissenting) (arguing an advancing gradual encroachment upon the sanctity of
private and public contracts).

368

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:351

gage is an adhesion contract.1 41 Moreover, the lender is currently
not required to offer any workout agreement. The lender-home
owner relationship is analogous to the railway worker-railroad com
pany relationship. Congress recognized the significance rail
transportation had on the economy.1 42 The Railway Labor Act
(RLA) reflected Congress's effort to foster economic peace be
tween railroad labor and management. 143 Harm from railway dis
putes reverberated throughout the economy.144 Just as the RLA
provided regulatory stability to a vital area of the economy, stan
dardized relief provisions offer similar stability to the residential
housing industry by providing better mitigation of loss incurred
from a large-scale natural or economic disaster.
Justice Holmes rightly declared that" 'experience'" is the" 'life
of the law,'" and no experience is greater than crisis or emer
gency.1 45 Times of crises demonstrate certain formalities of the law
inevitability yield practical solutions to human problems. 146 In fact,
lenders increasingly use workout agreements to avoid additional
10ss.147 Lenders voluntarily turned to workout plans for 155,495 de
linquent mortgages in 2004; and in the first quarter of 2005 alone
recognized a significant increase to 89,741, approximately a forty
three percent increase. 148 While lenders are making efforts to man
age the current stream of delinquent loans, current number of
141. See generally Conn. Light & Power Co. v. DaSilva, 650 A.2d 551, 555 (Conn.
1994); Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Algona v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 619
(Iowa 1984); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 746 (Md. 2005).
142. By congressional authority, the President of the United States took over all
railroad operations on December 28, 1917, until Congress restored power to the rail
road companies through the Transportation Act of 1920. Pa. RR Co. v. U.S. RR
Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72, 73 (1923). Peace between labor and railway companies was
'''of the highest public interest to prevent interruption of interstate commerce.'" Tex.
& New Orleans RR v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 561 (1930) (quoting Pa.
R.R. Co., 261 U.S. at 79). The Railway Labor Act of 1926 was "a fresh start" to achieve
economic peace, and it repealed the Transportation Acts of 1913 and 1920. Id. at 563
64.
143. The Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.c. §§ 151-188 (2000)).
144. 1 MICHAEL H. CAMPBELL & EDWARD C. BREWER III, THE RAILWAY LA
BOR Acr OF 1926, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 216-17 (1988) (noting how transportation
costs affect agricultural consumer goods).
145. Levinson, supra note 52, at 726 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 1 (1881)).
146. Id. at 727.
147. E.g., Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16; Cutts & Green, supra note 4;
Johnston, supra note 138.
148. Johnston, supra note 138, at 871.
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workouts is just a trickle compared to the massive delinquent reser
voir from which they flOW. 149
Overall, the workout plans implemented by legislation need to
be consistent and sufficiently flexible in dealing with the legitimate
social interest of homeownership.150 Measures discussed below can
function individually or be combined with others to mold the miti
gation response to each fact-sensitive situation. Ultimately, the
workout plan should seek to balance the lender's contractual rights
with the homeowner's interest to fulfill the contractual obligations
and retain the home. 151
G.

No- and Low-Cost Mitigation Measures

A potential challenge to any mitigation measure is that a party
may want to retain the initial contractual rights that were enjoyed
prior to a catastrophe.1 52 The mitigation measure, by its very appli
cation in post-disaster relief, changes the balance, mostly against a
lender's interest. Some measures are easily implemented with in
significant costs; but other measures have substantial financial con
sequences for lenders. The lender's burden could be justified by
the benefit to society of avoiding unconscionable results.153 An
other view is that such measures discussed below are nominal in
cost and do not impact a lender's right and ability to eventually
receive repayment of the indebtedness.
Pragmatically speaking, the homeowner should give something
in return for the benefit of mitigation measures in post-disaster re
lief. A simple way is to predetermine the value of a relief provision,
associate a dollar amount with it, and apply the relief cost to the
balance of the loan upon implementation. The cost can be a flat fee
or a percentage of the loan.1 54 A percentage-based fee is a better
option because it addresses the degree of risk the lender faces-the
larger the loan, the more the lender may lose. The flat-fee scheme
makes it more difficult to assess the value from loan to loan and
more arbitrary to determine an amount. Similar to a common prac
149. The volume of mortgage originations in 2004 was $2.7 trillion. 2007 RE·
supra note 6, at 35.
150. Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 13; see also Wright, supra note 11, at 242.
151. L. Leon Geyer, Risk Sharing Down on the Farm: A Comparison of Farmer
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Statutes or Selling the Farm, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 331, 334
(1997).
152. Rosenthal, supra note 93, at 897, 912.
153. Id. at 909.
154. See supra text accompanying note 131.
PORTER FACf BOOK,
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tice to pay points or fees at closing to reduce an interest rate, a
percentage-based relief provision bases the fee on the outstanding
principal balance at the time of implementation.1 55 For some of the
mitigation measures outlined below, it would be appropriate for the
homeowner to pay for the relief option, rather than forcing the
lender to shoulder the costs alone.
1.

Notice of Rights

Some lenders currently use workout plans at their discretion.
However, most homeowners have no notice or knowledge of the
availability of such measures. 156 Legislation should place an affirm
ative duty on lenders to notify homeowners in disaster areas of
what rights or options they have to manage a mortgage obligation
in the wake of a crisis.1 57 Notice overcomes a real problem that
unsophisticated homeowners face: not knowing what can be done
after the disaster. Many homeowners fail to consider contingencies
when signing financing documents. Lenders are in a better position
to understand workout plans and educate customers.
Legislation, however, may not be necessary since some lenders
already communicate relief provision to homeowners. 158 The con
tractual agreement states obligations, rights, and remedies. The
homeowner has a similar availability to communicate with the
lender. Additional notice may be viewed as unnecessary because
the contract already outlines remedies. 159 Yet, mortgage terms and
business practices are likely to vary within the industry and can be
better managed by legislation.
Notice overcomes the homeowner's mindset that lenders de
mand each monthly payment without modification. The cost to
lenders is insignificant, and the party's contractual obligations re
main intact and unencumbered with such a simple term. 160
Mandatory notice to a homeowner that the lender may discuss the
155. 15 U.S.c. § 1602(aa) (2000).
156. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 849. Initially, the 1985 Minnesota
moratorium law did not require that the homeowner be notified of statutory relief pro
visions. Id. However, this was subsequently modified by the Minnesota Legislature in
1986. See 1987 Minn. Laws ch. 292, § 36 (repealing MINN. STAT. §§ 583.01-.12, Minne
sota's moratorium on mortgage foreclosures).
157. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 849.
158. Cf Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 6, 13 (stating that Fannie Mae strongly
encouraged servicers to contact borrowers and determine their status of rebuilding,
payoff indebtedness, or abandonment).
159. See supra text accompanying note 120.
160. Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 3-4, 13.

LARGE-SCALE DISASTERS

2008]

371

modification of contract terms is a straightforward mitigation mea
sure that needs no additional fees to implement.
2.

Credit Reporting Hold

The industry lending practice is for lenders to report late or
missed payments to credit bureaus. Another no-cost measure to
mitigate loss would be for a lender to refrain from reporting missed
payments due to a disaster to credit agencies. 161 A hold on credit
reporting acknowledges the impact of circumstances that exist be
yond a homeowner's control and avoids creating an inaccurate rep
resentation of the homeowner's credit fitness. 162
While lenders generally reserve the right to report delinquent
mortgage payments as leverage for repayment, this provision is not
essential to the obligation for the homeowner to repay principal
and interest. 163 In the context of a disaster, a damaged credit rating
decreases the likelihood that homeowners will obtain subsequent
financing, rental housing, or other services based on credit rat
ings.t 64 Thus, the homeowner's financial fitness and character is
under additional strain, and the inability to prevent foreclosure in
creases. A hold on reporting a mortgage payment delinquency is
likely to avoid this result. This relief provision can readily be imple
mented with little cost to the lender. Thus, the homeowner should
not be required to pay fees for such relief.
3.

Forbearance

Forbearance is a relief measure that many lenders have utilized
in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. 165 Forbearance of
mortgage payments can be a short-term suspension (one-to-three
month) or long-term (four-to-twelve month) of mortgage pay
ments. 166 Repayment of the suspended payments may occur (1) at
161. Letter from Pamela S. Johnson, Senior Vice President, Fannie Mae, to All
Fannie Mae Single-Family Mortgage Servicers, at 2 (May 11, 2006) (reminding mort
gage sellers and servicers not to report delinquency to credit repositories if missed pay
ments were likely attributable to the hurricanes), available at http://www.efanniemae.
com/sf/guides/ssglannltrs/pdf/2006/ll0306.pdf.
162. Id.
163. See generally 2007 REPORTER FACT BOOK, supra note 6, at 19-20 (discussing
the options that homeowners have for nonpayments).
164. Id. at 22-24.
165. See Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uniform Instrument, supra note 120 (indicating
that forbearance may be appropriate).
166. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 843 (stating that delayed payments
can be amortized back into the loan to reflect the homeowner's arrearages). Short-term
repayment can be made at the end of the forbearance period, long-term payments can
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the end of the forbearance period as a "balloon" payment or (2)
after the maturity date is extended to the extent of the forbearance
period.1 67 Government Security Enterprises (GSE) like Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac have strongly encouraged mortgage partners
to temporarily forbear collection of principal and interest payments
to those affected by Hurricane Katrina. 168
A temporary delay in a mortgage-indebtedness payment is a
financial risk to the lender. The delay in payment, in effect, shifts
the short-term recovery costs to the lender even though many mort
gage agreements leave the onus for payment on the borrower. 169
While rarely recognized by courts, another risk a lender faces is
forbearance acting as a waiver of the acceleration clause pO
This "shock absorber" approach is unique because during for
bearance the "middle man" protects mortgage investors and home
owners at no additional government expenditure. Forbearance is a
highly viable relief measure because of the elasticity provided by
securitization in the secondary mortgage market. l71 GSEs have the
capacity to absorb a large amount of non- or partial payments with
no additional government funding, as illustrated by the current
lender response to the 2005 hurricane season. 172 This type of relief
provision is more suited to charge a homeowner a percentage-based
fee, which helps offset the strain on the lender resulting from the
temporary stoppage of payments.
4.

Reverse Mortgages

A reverse mortgage is another measure to provide relief to
lenders and homeowners and to mitigate loss deriving from a disas
ter.173 This mortgage tool has historically been used for elderly
be amortized back into the loan or paid in full at the end of the period and, lastly, the
loan can be negotiated and permanently modified in terms that the homeowner can
afford. UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET, supra note 2, at 6.
167. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 843.
168. Silverman, supra note 163; Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uniform Instrument,
supra note 120.
169. Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uniform Instrument, supra note 120 ("Borrower
shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt.").
170. See generally Waiver of Right to Foreclose Mortgage, 148 A.L.R. 686 (1944).
171. Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency

Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 799-801 (2005).
172. See supra text accompanying note 137.
173. FANNIE MAE, HOME EQUITY CONVERSION MORTGAGE CONSUMER FACT
SHEET (2004), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/homebuyers/hecm
striper.pdf; see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 955-58.
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homeowners who have a low debt-to-equity ratio,174 The "cash
rich" home serves as collateral for the mortgage, and the lender
makes monthly payments to the "cash-poor" homeowner by charg
ing the payment against the home's equity,175 All the fees to imple
ment this measure can be lumped into the loan when reversed. At
the end of the loan period, the homeowner must pay the indebted
ness in full or modify the loan terms.
One drawback is the possibility of a sharp reduction in the
home's equity caused by a disaster,176 Lenders require that the col
lateral meet specific equity levels for this type of financial tool to be
feasible,177 Without the equity cushion, the lender would shoulder
an unreasonable amount of the risk. 178
However, in the cases where sufficient equity remains, tempo
rary application of reverse mortgage principles ensures that full and
timely payments are made to the lender and the homeowner does
not default on the contractual obligation. 179 The reverse mortgage
is beneficial when the homeowner faces economic inability to make
payments. An example would be if the homeowner's employer's
business is destroyed or delayed and the homeowner has no income
to pay the mortgage. The reverse mortgage avoids the high cost of
government grants and regulatory oversight. 180 Even though a re
verse mortgage increases the lender's risk with a higher loan-to
value ratio, the lender will receive monthly installments that would
be in doubt without the application of the reverse mortgage. With
Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 844. This measure is ideal for eco
nomic disasters where the homeowner is cash-poor and house-rich. !d. at 84S.
17S. [d. at 844. For each transfer the loan balance will grow that amount of prin
cipal and interest will be charged on that amount. [d.
176. UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET, supra note 2, at 6. Nearly three
quarters of homes impacted by Hurricane Katrina suffered a loss in equity of up to half
of the pre-disaster value. ld.
177. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 844.
178. ld. at 84S. Legislation or the parties would need to establish a minimum
amount of equity necessary. [d. This base could be the amount needed for the home
owner to resume payment or remedy the default. ld. For example, twelve months for a
disaster small in scope where recovery is quicker and twenty-four months for a large
scale disaster where relief is slow. Victims of Hurricane Katrina would generally fall
under the twenty-four month period.
179. ld.
180. See generally Wright, supra note 11. The HOLe response to the Great De
pression was to make a large amount of monies available for loans and the FHA imple
mented regulation on the mortgage industry to improve the impoverished housing
market. ld. Since Hurricane Katrina, the federal government has allocated $11.5 bil
lion dollars in reconstruction efforts: $6.2 billion for Louisiana and $S.OS8 billion for
Mississippi. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
119 Stat. 2680, 2779-80 (200S); Brown, supra note 1, at S1.
174.
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the homeowner remaining in the home, the collateral is pro
tected.1 81 The homeowner could simply petition the court for statu
tory exercise of the reverse mortgage, which avoids the increased
burden of out-of-pocket mortgage payments during efforts to repair
the home and provide alternative housing. 182
5. Disaster Default Insurance
Mandatory mortgage default insurance is another possible
measure to mitigate loss resulting from a disaster. 183 Conceptually,
default insurance is where an insurer continues to pay the monthly
mortgage payments to the lender and the homeowner does not be
come delinquent on the loan. In contrast to hazard insurance, it
does not insure against loss to the physical structure, just payment
for mortgage payments to prevent delinquency. This measure
would insure against the homeowner's inability to pay the monthly
mortgage payment due to circumstances beyond his control arising
from a large-scale disaster. 184 The homeowner would pay the pre
mium along with the monthly payment of principal, interest, prop
erty taxes, and hazard insurance. 185 After a crisis, the homeowner
would file a claim and the third-party insurer would pay the lender
monthly mortgage payments, on behalf of the homeowner, for a
predetermined period of time. Thus, lenders would receive their
monthly mortgage payments, while homeowners could apply availa
ble resources to recovery efforts without becoming delinquent on
the loan.
181. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 845. Essentially the fictional trans
fer from the lender to the homeowner serves as rent. Id.
182. E.g., Sutherland v. Barclays Am. Mortgage Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614, 617
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997). If repairs are necessary, the homeowner's burden doubles: paying
rent while fulfilling the obligation to make existing mortgage payments. All this is done
while paying costs associated with the disaster: repairs, replacement of lost personal
property, or additional travel expenses. Id. at 617-18.
183. Generally, hazard insurance issues fall outside the purview of this Article.
184. Homes & Communities, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 203(b) Mort
gage Insurance, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsglsfhlins/sfh203b.cfm (last visited Feb. 16,
2007). If the mortgage enters default and the home is sold for less than the remaining
mortgage debt, then the private mortgage insurance covers the shortage and the bor
rower has no deficiency judgment looming.
185. Homes & Communities, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., FAQs About
Escrow Accounts for Consumers, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsglsfhlres/respafaq.cfm
(last visited Feb. 16,2007) (describing the function and operation of the escrow account
for the purpose of paying taxes and hazard insurance).
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In theory, default insurance spreads the risk of loss across a
greater base, thus, lessening the financial impact. 186 The premiums
paid by the homeowner would likely be minimal and provide relief
to each policyholder at a critical juncture that would facilitate re
covery for both individuals and the housing industry. In practice,
however, this mitigation measure will ultimately fail. Historical ex
perience with the hazard insurance industry teaches that insurance
is too small a tool to deal with large-scale disasters.
While insurance appears on its face to be a reasonable loss
mitigation measure, disasters have exposed a flaw of home hazard
insurance: magnitude.t 87 For example, in 1992, Florida's hazard in
surance claims from Hurricane Andrew exceeded some insurance
companies' ability to cover the $17 billion in insured damage. 188 As
a result, policyholders "submitted 280,000 claims and recovered
[only] $11 billion or 65 percent of total insured loss," while seven
smaller insurers became insolvent. 189 Florida's legislative response
to the insurance failure created the state-run Residential Property
and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association and the Florida Hur
ricane Catastrophe Fund, which yield significant hope to mitigate
the financial loss caused by future disasters. 19o
However, the underlying problem remains: the magnitude of
large-scale disasters. Because of this issue, many insurance compa
nies have already exited the industry. If private insurers offer disas
ter default prevention policies, premiums are likely to be cost
prohibitive. The state-run insurers have a finite fiscal capacity. At
this time there is not a third line of defense against astronomical
economic loss, leaving the insurance industry vulnerable. If a state
institution is to shoulder the over-burdensome economic loss, gov
ernment insolvency is a distinct possibility.
The 1994 California Northridge earthquake resulted in $12.5
billion in residential damage and overwhelmed insurers' financial
186. DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND
BEYOND 187-88, 193-95 (2006) (comparing default insurance to the operation of the
federal disaster insurance program).
187. [d. at 167-69 (outlining the disastrous results of Hurricane Andrew, the larg
est natural disaster to date).
188. Id. In 1992, Florida property insurers collected $1.5 billion in premiums.
Claims paid out were ten times greater than premiums paid. Id. at 168.
189. Id. at 167-68. Of the 300 insurers providing coverage before Hurricane An
drew, thirty-four gave notice to state insurance regulators of the intent to withdraw
permanently and twenty-nine insurers reduced their coverage options in Florida. Even
the reinsurance companies limited coverage offered to Florida residents. Id. at 168.
190. Id. at 167.
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capacity to respond to the policyholders' claims.1 91 This natural dis
aster resulted in ninety-three percent of earthquake insurers either
drastically reducing hazard insurance or refusing to underwrite poli
cies completely.192 Not only were Northridge earthquake claims on
shaky ground, but reduction in participating insurers threatened the
viability of the housing market and efforts to emerge from the cur
rent economic recession. 193
Some insurance companies in the California residential indus
try exited the market and the state government responded by creat
ing a state-run insurance program. 194 In 1996, California responded
by organizing the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) as a pri
vately funded, publicly managed program to insure against future
earthquake 10ss.195 California, as a result of the autonomous CEA,
is the largest residential earthquake insurer in the world. 196
Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake resulted in
unpaid or partially paid claims and essentially left the residential
insurance market with few willing participants. One study esti
mated that another hurricane, with the same force in the same loca
tion as Andrew, would cause damages close to $70 billion-nearly
double the 1992 figure.1 97 State government is now the insurer, and
it is unclear whether the state insurance programs can satisfy future
natural disaster claims. Should an exorbitant number of claims be
submitted, who will bailout the state governments' insurance im
plosion? State-sponsored social welfare policies should not extend
to include this kind of insurance program because its sustain ability
is unproven. Homeowners living in risk-prone areas should shoul
der the risk when it arises, rather than requiring persons at much
lower risk levels to assume heavy financial costs.
For large-scale disasters, default insurance is a less effective
mitigation measure. This type of insurance will fail to meet the
191. California Earthquake Authority, http://www.earthquakeauthority.com (last
visited Feb. 16, 2007).
192. Id. To remedy the inability or exit of insurers, state government established
state-run insurance programs with the caveat that once existing reserves are exhausted,
no more relief is available. CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.30 (West 2005).
193. California Earthquake Authority, supra note 191.
194. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 186, at 197.
195. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10089.5-.54.
196. California Earthquake Authority, supra note 191. This only took two years.
The CEA was created in 1995 and in 1997 it became one of the largest earthquake
insurers. Cal. Earthquake Authority, History, http://www.earthquakeauthority.com!
index.aspx?id=7&pid=1 (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).
197. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 186, at 168.
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overwhelming demand of claims filed by policyholders.1 98 In addi
tion, insurance companies tend to limit coverage or withdraw from
the insurance market after disasters, resulting in numerous and
costly claims, thus leaving the homeowner, housing markets, and
general economic health exposed and vulnerable. 199
III.
A.

THE HEAVY HAND OF CRAMDOWN LEGISLATION

Introduction

Historically, farmers have been afforded financial relief by
means of a forced debt reduction. 20o Lawmakers have often com
pared the plight of farmers with that of homeowners. 201 Homeown
ers, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, suffered rapid home
depreciation and undersecured debt just as farmers during the
1980s experienced notable depreciation of land that led to under
secured mortgage debt.202
The Chapter 12 cramdown bankruptcy provision made availa
ble for family farmers should also be available for homeowners.203
Many perceive farmers as the backbone of America. 204 Similarly,
the residential mortgage industry, in the view of many, is essential
to the American economy.205 During times of disaster and despair,
public outcry has rung in the ears of lawmakers to assist the farmer
and to assist the homeowner. 206 A high number of farm foreclo
198. The same pattern is beginning to emerge with the Gulf States. Southern
District of Mississippi Judge L.T. Senter, Jr., ruled that a claim for damages from Ka
trina's storm surge is not a valid claim under the hazard insurance policy. Leonard v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006), affd, 499 F.3d 419 (5th
Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, Jan. 2, 2008; see Judge: Insurance Policy Excluded
Flood Damage, MSNBC.coM, Aug. 15,2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14362386/
fromJET (last visited Aug. 15, 2006). The ruling could set the precedent for many pend
ing and future insurance challenges, upholding the insurance industry's denial of bil
lions of dollars in claims arising out of the hurricane's landfall.
199. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 186, at 161.
200. See generally James J. White, Taking from Farm Lenders and Farm Debtors:
Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 J. CORP. L. 1 (1987).
201. Geyer, supra note 151, at 333.
202. Id.; see Brown, supra note 1, at 34.
203. 11 U.S.c. §§ 1201-1231 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (codifying Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554,
100 Sta t. 3088).
204. Farm Bankruptcy Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and the Sub
comm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
at 2 (1986) [hereinafter Farm Bankruptcy Hearing] (statement of Rep. Michael Synar).
205. Wright, supra note 11, at 242.
206. See Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 822-23 (describing the public
sentiment for the governor and legislatures to help ailing farmers); Wright, supra note
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sures depresses equity of adjoining farms, just as a high number of
home foreclosures depresses equity in the residential community.207
Congress should give the same degree of deference to homeowners
recovering from a devastating catastrophe that it has offered to dis
tressed family farmers.
B.

Congressional Cram down Precedent

Secured-debt intervention dates back to the Depression era
with the Frazier-Lemke Act. 208 From 1935 to 1949, this legislation
enabled the adjustment of farmers' debt by extension of repayment
periods, moratorium on creditors' collection rights, and redemption
of farms at current appraised values. 209 In 1986, farmers received
debt assistance under Chapter 12 which allowed bifurcating under
secured debt into secured debt (the actual value) and unsecured
debt (loan amount less the present value).210
The farming credit crisis of the 1980s is another instance where
lawmakers codified cramdown provisions. 211 Nearly forty percent
of owners' equity evaporated through land value depreciation from
1981 to 1985. 212 During this time, farm commodity prices were be
low the cost of production, unemployment levels were near record
highs, the dollar was strong, exports were weak, and interest rates
were extremely high, leaving farmers in grave risk of losing their
farms through foreclosure. 213
Even though lawmakers conditioned Chapter 12 with a sunset
provision, Congress has consistently renewed the provision so that
cramdown relief is still available to family farmers. 214 Congress
11, at 242 (showing Depression relief efforts in the form of money allocation and regu
latory oversight).
207. Farm Bankruptcy Hearing, supra note 204, at 32 (statement of Rep. Michael
Synar).
208. Geyer, supra note 151, at 334.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. White, supra note 200, at 1-2.
212. 131 CONGo REc. 16,927 (1985) (statement of Rep. De La Garza); Farm
Bankruptcy Hearing, supra note 204, at 83 (statement of Ewen M. Wilson, Deputy As
sistant Secretary for Economics, U.S. Department of Agriculture).
213. See Wright, supra note 11, at 806.
214. See Act of Oct. 25, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-369, § 2(a), 118 Stat. 1749 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221 (2000»; Act of Aug. 15, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-73,
§ 2(a), 117 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of Dec. 19, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-377, § 2(a), 116 Stat. 3115 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221);
Act of May 13, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, tit. X, § 10814(a), 116 Stat. 532 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1221); Act of June 26, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-17, § 1, 115 Stat.
151 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of May 11, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-8,
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continues extending cram down provisions as a viable option for
family farmers even though the general conditions present at the
time of the initial passage no longer exist. 215 Therefore, the
cramdown is a tested and trusted means to protect a vital commu
nity interest and to give family farmers a fighting chance to recover
from economic disaster. This protection should be available to
qualified homeowners who are affected by natural or economic
disasters. 216
In response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, Congress once
again considered cramdown provisions. 217 In the 2005 Baker Bill,
which did not pass due to its complexity and efforts to acquire hur
ricane damaged properties, the House considered offering the
cramdown provision as a part of recovery efforts to Hurricane Ka
trina. 218 Concededly, Congress's action to forego the Baker Bill in
dicates less inclination to give homeowners the same benefits as
farmers. However, the cramdown provision is still of interest to
other politicians. Louisiana state lawmakers are debating whether
to enact similar cramdown measures for their citizens participating
in the Louisiana Homeowner Assistance Program. 219
C.

Basic Structure of Cramdown

Chapter 12 permits "bifurcation of undersecured debt into se
cured and unsecured debt."220 The secured amount is the post
cramdown appraised value and the unsecured amount is the
§ 1, 115 Stat. 10 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-70, § 1, 113 Stat. 1031 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of Mar.
30, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-5, § 1(1), (2), 113 Stat. 9 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1221); Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. I, § 149(a), 112 Stat. 2681
610 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of Aug. 6, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-65,
§ 1, 107 Stat. 311 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221).
215. Act of Oct. 25, 2004 § 2(a). This relief provision has been extended for
twenty years since its enactment in 1986.
216. Some opposed to cram down measures argue that this measure is a "substan
tial and retroactive alteration" of the lender's contractual rights and the homeowner's
obligation. White, supra note 200, at 1-2. Furthermore, the cramdown hinders home
owners' power to mortgage. ld.
217. Louisiana Recovery Corporation Act, H.R. 4100, 109th Congo (2005); John
A. Lovett, Rebuilding a Region: Housing Recovery Efforts in the Wake of Katrina and
Rita, PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 49, 50.
218. Lovett, supra note 217, at 50.
219. [d. at 52.
220. Geyer, supra note 151, at 334.
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original mortgage amount less the secured post-disaster value. 221
Some terms, such as the amortization period and interest rate, may
be changed under Chapter 12.222 The principal and interest pay
ments are revised and based only on the secured debt. 223
The potent cramdown provision is not a remedial measure for
all, especially those who are highly leveraged. 224 The cramdown al
ready passes a large unbargained-for loss to the lender. For highly
leveraged financing, the lender takes a greater loss than a lower
loan-to-value ratio would sustain. The highly leveraged home
owner has less incentive to recapture equity owing to the lender.
However, Congress, in its wisdom, made this provision available to
family farmers even though it deprives the creditor from having the
power to foreclose the land. 225
Reducing principal and interest payments based solely on se
cured mortgage debt is a practicable solution that lessens the
monthly payment burden on the homeowner and preserves the
lender's share of future asset appreciation. 226 Thus, foreclosure is
less likely to occur because the lender's security is preserved and
likely to appreciate while the homeowner continues making pay
ments against the mortgage indebtedness.
One drawback of the Chapter 12 cramdown provision is that it
fails to recognize and secure any postcramdown appreciation of the
collateral that appears under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.227 While appreciation is likely to be gradual, any increase
must be recognized and secured. 228 With time and effective re
sources, most homeowners can regain pre-disaster equity, and this
equity growth should be shared with the lender in the form of cor
221. Id. The rewriting of the debt does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the
lender's property rights because the reduced debt is what the lender would have re
ceived from the foreclosure sale. Id. at 338.
222. Id. at 334.
223. Id. at 335.
224. Farm Bankruptcy Hearing, supra note 204, at 49 (statement of Richard F.
Stagmen). If the farmer has exceeded sixty percent debt-to-asset ratio, the cram down
provision is not an appropriate remedy. Id.
225. White, supra note 200, at 17. In this case, the lender's right to foreclose, for
practical purposes, is not allowed under Chapter 12 cramdown. Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934) (upholding a Minnesota moratorium statute
that was partially based on the reasoning that the right to foreclose was not eliminated).
226. See Geyer, supra note 151, at 335-37 (noting that Chapter 12 merely pro
vides the creditor the right to "request an equitable share of future asset appreciation").
227. White, supra note 200, at 8-9.
228. Geyer, supra note 151, at 335.
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relating secured security interests. 229 Mortgage cramdown
more effective relief provision.
D.

381
IS

a

Rationale for the Residential Mortgage Cramdown

Reducing the secured debt and payments to pragmatic
amounts reasonably and effectively balances both parties' interests.
From the lender's perspective, the amount recovered at a foreclo
sure sale would, in theory, equal the post-disaster value of the
home, but would include administrative and legal costs to realize
the sale. 230 The cramdown measure reduces the secured debt to the
level that the lender would recover at a foreclosure sale and avoids
most administrative fees. 231 Some costs arise in implementing the
cramdown. Therefore, the secured debt maintains the lender's in
terest in the value it would have received from foreclosure and
costly foreclosure costs are not realized. The cramdown measure
places the lender in a similarly situated position as an executed
foreclosure action. In addition, home values are not decreasing,
which results in larger profits from interest rates based on larger
loan amounts. If lenders do foreclose, they remove their lender hat
and begin to wear their property manager hat. Generally, however,
lenders are not in the business of maintaining properties, assuming
property liabilities, and disposing homes.
From the homeowner's perspective, he retains ownership and a
vested interest to rebuild and recover. 232 A reduced mortgage pay
ment facilitates the homeowner's ability to make monthly payments
and, as a result, his financial well-being remains largely intact. Soci
ety benefits because greater loss in home values is avoided. The
difficult situation is dealt with between the parties and does not re
quire societal financial assistance. Also, tax revenues are preserved
because the property tax based on home values is not further re
duced during the post-disaster period.
Traditionally, lenders hold superior bargaining power over the
homeowner by maintaining the threat of foreclosing on the security
interest. 233 In some instances the threat of foreclosure leads to the
229. The argument made by creditors is that a debtor will use the cramdown pro
vision when the market is depressed and then sell the land for a substantial profit when
market prices increase. White, supra note 200, at 8-9.
230. See Geyer, supra note 151.
231. Id. at 335.
232. Id.
233. White, supra note 200, at 18-19.
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forced sale of the home, giving credibility to the threat. 234 In prac
tice, the lender does not have or exercise superior bargaining power
over homeowners because foreclosure threats made by lenders are
seldom carried out.235 Moreover, the idea of sustaining the lender's
threat of foreclosure is minimized because the existing industry par
adigm is that homeowners must pay the mortgage; if not, the lender
will foreclose. 236
The cramdown measure efficiently mitigates loss because crip
pling foreclosure costs are not realized. Home value appreciation is
more likely where the homeowner remains in the home with the
incentive to repair and maintain the premises. 237 Moreover, the ap
preciation directly reduces or eliminates the problem of the mort
gage being undersecured. 238
Another reason why a cramdown is efficient mitigation is that
the lenders may adjust the interest rate according to risk when ini
tially extending credit.239 Courts and legislators recognize that
"[m]arket rates of interest measure the real risks of nonpayment
and the costs of collection."24o Lenders are in the business of calcu
lating risk and charging borrowers accordingly. The downside is
that less credit is likely to be made available to homeowners, thus
reducing homeownership afford ability. In response to the family
farmer crisis during the 1980s, lenders with knowledge of cramdown
measures kept interest rates at comparable levels and implemented
more conservative lending practices for future loans.241 The codifi
cation of the cramdown measure did not cause interest rates to
spike like the lenders clamored it would. 242 The farmers faced the
same problem that confronts homeowners who would benefit from
the cramdown: lenders extending less credit. A fewer number of
homeowners would qualify for mortgage financing.
234. Id.
235. See 2007 REPORTER FACT BOOK, supra note 6, at 21.
236. Id. at 2.
237. Geyer, supra note 151, at 337. When a homeowner retains possession, taxes
are likely to be paid, which generates revenue for local government and schools. Fur
ther, home values are not depressed by low foreclosure sales. In addition, homeowners
have incentive to work, which helps economic recovery.
238. Id. at 334-35. Many are critical of the Chapter 12 structure that prohibits the
lender to recognize the appreciation of the collateral. If this fixed base line was re
moved, then the undersecured problem would be minimized.
239. See generally Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., 102 F.3d 874, 876
(7th Cir. 1996).
240. Id.
241. Geyer, supra note 151, at 339-40.
242. Id.
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Most large-scale disasters expose the reality between those
who have more and those who have less. 243 Historically, society has
collectively taken efforts to extend a helping hand to those who fall
victim to such disasters. 244 As noted above, during the Great De
pression, allocating congressional funds was a less effective means
to recover from a catastrophe. 245 Rules and regulations have
worked better to create a more effective recovery system. Overall,
the cramdown measure extends assistance to disaster victims at
nominal cost to governments, businesses, and individuals. 246
Some lenders argue that a cramdown measure increases the
debtor's wealth and decreases the creditor's equity.247 The right to
foreclose permits the lender to elect to foreclose and recapture the
home's value at the current levels or to defer foreclosure intending
to hedge for future appreciation. 248 The cramdown measure, in its
most basic form, makes the decision for the lender. The Chapter 12
scheme suspends foreclosure and destroys the lender's right to elect
whether or not to carry the mortgage, thereby allocating apprecia
tion to the debtor. 249 Because the post-disaster recovery period is
so pivotal to both parties and decisions must be made relatively
quickly, the decision to make cramdown measures available must
be made long before the unfortunate circumstances rear their ugly
heads.
A cramdown measure in response to large-scale disasters
should integrate the concept of shared appreciation between home
owner and lender. 250 Sharing the home's appreciation is the most
pragmatic approach to balancing each party's interests in the wake
of a cramdown. Shared appreciation minimizes transfer of wealth
from the lender to the homeowner and seeks to place both parties
in the position they would have been in but for the disaster. More
over, little wealth transfers from richer citizens to poorer citizens

243. White, supra note 200, at 23.
244. Wright, supra note 11, at 242, 246.
245. See generally supra Part I.e.
246. 131 CONGo REC. 16,924 (1985) (statement of Rep. Synar). The policy reme
dies in the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act required no allocation of taxpayer money,
"this bill does not cost [the Treasury] one red cent." [d.
247. White, supra note 200, at 23.
248.
249.
250.

[d.
Id.
See Geyer, supra note 151, at 341.
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because policy-based remedies cost taxpayers very little to imple
ment this measure of disaster relief. 251
Congress allocated $11.5 billion in Community Development
Block Grant funds for areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Rita. 252 This is a patent transfer of wealth from the tax
payer who has more, to the victim who has less.253 A cramdown
measure, with shared appreciation, will not redistribute the wealth
from the lender to the homeowner. 254
The general rule in America is that freedom to contract exists
for all. 255 Upon entering the mortgage obligation, one is bound to
fully comply, regardless of the circumstances. 256 Many homeown
ers take pride in ownership and in honoring their obligations to re
pay outstanding debt. Affording homeowners the chance to pay
the debt retains their dignity and self respect, which public policy
recognizes as traditional farmer and homeowner values. 257
This issue is real. In one setting, the onus felt by an indebted
person to repay debt strained a citizen of North Carolina into tak
ing his life because he was unable to cope with the dire circum
stances of undersecured debt and his momentary inability to meet
his pecuniary obligation. 258 No financial obligation, no matter the
amount, is worth a person's life. Policy and law should encourage
251. See generally Wright, supra note 11. This is one reason why the FHA was so
successful in long-term recovery efforts during the Depression era.
252. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
119 Stat. 2680, 2779-80 (2005).
253. Wright, supra note 11, at 242-43. The HOLC's focus was to thrust money
into the mortgage market to reverse the tightening of available credit. Id.
254. The idea of wealth transfer is difficult to quantify. It is merely a guessing
game contingent on factors like appraisal value, consumer surplus, and market demand
versus the property owner's valuation. See generally White, supra note 200, at 22-29
(discussing redistribution of wealth in Chapter 12 bankruptcy cases). Lending institu
tions argued that a cramdown measure would result in less credit availability because
banks would withdraw from the market. Furthermore, the exiting lenders would justify
high lending costs and interest rates passed to the farmer. Id. at 26-27. However, over
time these fears were not realized. In fact, the interest rates remained at relatively
normal levels and a very small number of agricultural lenders increased their interest
rate. Given the farming credit crisis, the response was expected, with or without the
cramdown provision. Banks implemented more conservative lending policies such as
more reliance on cash flow and decreasing loans based on security interest in collateral.
Geyer, supra note 151, at 339-41.
255. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448
(1934); White, supra note 200, at 17.
256. Id.
257. 131 CONGo REc. 16,924 (1985) (statement of Rep. Synar).
258. Id. 16,925-26 (statement of Rep. Jones).
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parties to honor financial obligations while caring for those reeling
from a large-scale catastrophe.
E.

Substitutes as Incentives

Where a lender is subjected to cramdown provisions and incurs
financial loss from the homeowner's delay in payments or failure to
fully repay, substitutes should ameliorate the loss. The law should
make certain "carrots," as well as "sticks," available to lenders
whose secured mortgaged debt is reduced by cramdown mea
sures. 259 The intent of substitutes is to place the lender as close as
possible to the original mortgage terms being fulfilled. 260 Lenders
are in the business to increase profit by increasing revenue or re
ducing costs. While substitutes are not likely to increase a lender's
revenue, they can reduce costs that lenders have in their business
operations. Tax incentives and a goodwill system are discussed in
turn.
One incentive for lenders would be tax incentives to those sub
jected to cramdowns. 261 For example, a tax credit or deduction
based on all or part of the bifurcated unsecured mortgage debt fi
nancially benefits a lender and softens the financial blow. The re
duction in tax revenue, admittedly, is a detriment to the general tax
base because it reduces tax revenue from lending enterprises. 262
The lender would further benefit, in addition to the tax incentive,
where the homeowner repays, in part or in full, the unsecured debt.
Creating a system to rank or standardize a lender's recovery
efforts is yet another incentive to enhance the goodwill of the lend
ing institution. 263 Just as borrowers are rated by a credit system, a
259. Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the Boundaries of the Community Reinvest
ment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based Framework for Gen
erating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 724 (1996)
(discussing the incentives and regulations surrounding the Community Reinvestment
Act that seek to encourage lenders to make financing available to low- and moderate
income communities).
260. A gap created by reduced payments and security is filled by incentives that
differ in terms from the original mortgage obligation.
261. See, e.g., 1.R.c. § 165(a) (2006) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction any
loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise. ").
262. See id. Similar tax provisions can be implemented to benefit those lenders
affected by the mortgage cramdown.
263. This proposed goodwill concept is analogous to the State of Washington's or
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) efforts to establish goodwill by means of
grading apple quality. The Supreme Court upheld the Washington State Apple Adver
tising Commission's efforts to keep grade labeling on apple boxes sold in North Caro
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lender can be evaluated on their efforts to help homeowners in a
natural disaster. 264 Although quantifying the value of goodwill im
posed by such a system may seem complex, the benefits are sub
stantiaL The lenders' enhanced reputation will help retain current
borrowers and attract new customers.265 This is of particular im
portance in an industry where lenders are constantly seeking to re
tain and attract patrons.
Tax deductions and a goodwill system cannot replace the origi
nal terms of the mortgage contract. However, these incentive mea
sures smooth over the scarring and gaps arising from the mitigation
efforts that the cramdown provision affords. The incentive mea
sures are of particular importance to the lender because cramdowns
harshly reduce their valid, secured mortgage interest.
The cramdown measure is not intended to be an absolute cure;
rather a tool of last resort. This stiff, but reasonable, measure gives
homeowners a fighting chance to pick themselves up and continue
forward with relief efforts. A looming cramdown equalizes the bar
gaining power during workout negotiations. 266 As a result, fewer
homes foreclose, fewer neighborhoods are economically depressed,
lenders may receive payment in full, and the individual homeowner
and community are empowered with an opportunity to overcome
tremendous financial burdens. 267
lina, where a North Carolina statute prohibited labeling displayed on closed apple
boxes. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Washington
State, the nation's largest apple producer, has a specific agency to promote and protect
the state apple industry, thereby protecting the goodwill of Washington apple farmers
and sustaining their profits. Id. at 336-37. The apple industry views Washington State
apples as equal or superior to those graded according to the USDA standards. Id. at
351-52. That grading system is a tool that molds public perception which in turn bene
fits Washington State farmers' reputation and pocketbook. Id.
264. See Marcus, supra note 259, at 725-27.
265. !d. at 718-19.
266. White, supra note 200, at 26-27. The workout agreement is done in the
shadow of the farmer's alternative of a Chapter 12 cramdown. Id.
267. In comparing the cramdown provision to elements set forth by the Supreme
Court in Blaisdell, the debate is on what is "reasonable." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). First, the cramdown seeks to protect a vital community
interest, homeownership. Id. at 444-45. Second, the legislation implementing
cramdown provisions addresses the protection of the legitimate social interest of disas
ter recovery and community sustainability. Id. at 445. Third, the provision is based on
the appropriate and reasonable conditions of a large-scale disaster that significantly
impacts lives, homes, and communities. Id. Fourth, conditions must consider both par
ties because appreciation in the home's equity is recognized as secured debt and pay
ments are based on the smaller secured debt-rather than on the original indebtedness.
Id. at 445-46. Fifth, the cramdown provision is only limited to the particular disaster.
Id. at 447.
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CONCLUSION

Thus, we see that recovery costs of natural disasters alone can
be enormous as demonstrated by Hurricane Katrina's estimated
property damages of $75 billion. 268 If homeowners stumble into de
fault and foreclosure results, the associated costs are significant for
both the homeowner and lender. 269 Furthermore, the ripple effect
is widespread, impacting both communities and industries through
depressed prices, lost revenues, and lost tax base. 27o
Empowering the contracting parties for long-term success, not
ephemeral monetary aid, is the appropriate action to take. A stan
dardized framework is the means by which lenders can determine
future risk and associated costs, and homeowners are afforded
knowledge of and access to mitigation measures. In considering
less effective and more effective mitigation measures, organizing
standardized relief provisions fosters the necessary post-disaster
perspective for the homeowner and lender, and preserves, while not
perfectly, both parties' prevailing contractual interests. The
favorable, tangible end result is secured homeownership, dimin
ished financial loss for the residential mortgage industry, and has
tened community recovery.

268.
269.
270.

See Brown, supra note 1, at 34.
Id.
See id.; Hatcher, supra note 97.

